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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Internet has become more prevalent over the past couple of 
decades, misuse of the Internet for criminal and terrorist activity has led 
American government officials to endeavor to improve their ability to deal 
with these threats. Criminal use of the Internet to take advantage of the 
government’s limitations and circumvent traditional government phone 
wiretaps has inspired the Obama administration to create a task force led by 
officials from the Justice and Commerce Departments, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (“FBI”), and other agencies.1 The goal of the task force is 
to expand the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act 
(“CALEA”), which was passed in 1994 to regulate telephone and 
broadband companies to ensure compliance with standards “so that they 
can begin conducting surveillance of a target immediately after being 
presented with a court order.”2  
President Obama’s task force intends to add provisions to CALEA 
that would allow the government to require “all services that enable 
communications – including encrypted e-mail transmitters like BlackBerry, 
social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that allows direct 
‘peer to peer’ messaging like Skype – to be technically capable of 
complying if served with a wiretap order.”3 The expansion of CALEA 
would likely widen its scope to social networking sites, instant messaging, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devices and Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/w/wiretapping_and_other 
_eavesdropping_devices_and_methods/index.html. 
 2. Id.; Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006). 
 3. Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html? pagewanted=all 
[hereinafter Savage Sept. 27]. 
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gaming consoles that allow conversation among multiple players, and to 
word processing software that allows communication through Internet 
access.4 
CALEA was first passed to require telephone and broadband 
companies to construct services that enable efficient and prompt 
compliance with wiretap orders. While the FCC has previously interpreted 
this 1994 version of CALEA to require compliance by communications 
over the Internet using Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (“VoIP”) technology,5 
the expansion to all Internet communications would have significant 
consequences for the use of the Internet as we know it. The unique 
architecture of the Internet lends it to particular vulnerabilities with the 
consequence that an expansion of CALEA to all Internet communications 
would create problems regarding the innovative nature of the Internet as 
well as national security concerns. The proposed expansion of CALEA also 
raises free speech and privacy issues. 
This Note will examine the competing interests related to expanding 
CALEA and will weigh the potential benefits and consequences of CALEA 
to conclude that substantially more information is needed to justify a 
change. Part II will give a background of wiretap and surveillance law, and 
establish the role of CALEA within the scope of this field of law. Part III 
will lay out the expansion proposal and the proposed requirements, in 
addition to discussing the reaction of online companies to the expansion 
thus far.  
Part IV will discuss the relationship between the government and 
online companies. While the Internet was created by the U.S. government, 
this section will outline how once the Internet was beginning to be utilized 
by the public and other countries, the government allowed industry to take 
over primary control, while the government took a regulatory role. The 
status of this relationship has changed more recently, with a growing 
partnership between the government and the private sector. This section 
will discuss the potential implications of that development.  
Part V will look at many of the arguments made against the expansion 
by opponents to the proposal. This examination will demonstrate that there 
are interests of the American public at stake. The CALEA expansion would 
likely have a negative impact on the use of the Internet as a means of 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Laura W. Murphy & Christopher Calabrese, Going Dark: Lawful Electronic 
Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies, ACLU 3 (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ACLU_Statement_for_the_Record_On_Proposed_Updates
_to_the_Communications_Assistance_to_Law_Enforcement_Act_CALEA.pdf. 
 5. Susan Landau, National Security on the Line, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
409, 410 (2006). 
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communication, and would create the danger of chilling public speech. 
Another interest that will be discussed is the danger to Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights of Americans due to both the propensity of Internet users to 
reveal more information about themselves online, and the potential 
vulnerabilities of CALEA software, which could create the potential for 
access by third parties. The design of the Internet will also be discussed to 
demonstrate that the suggested change in CALEA would have implications 
for the Internet as it is currently structured, as well as national security 
concerns. This section will then discuss the potential economic and 
innovative issues which could arise, indicating that a change in the law 
would potentially have a negative impact on booming Internet industries. 
Part V will conclude by discussing the impact that the proposal would have 
internationally, both through the danger of any newly-developed software’s 
use by foreign governments and the impact of the requirements of the law 
on foreign companies.  
Part VI of this Note will then examine the counterarguments to these 
concerns, outlining the government interests behind the CALEA proposal. 
The government’s argument that the expansion of the Act would not 
correlate to an expansion of government authority will first be examined, 
followed by a discussion of the government interest in preventing and 
investigating crime. The last section of Part VI will respond to national 
security arguments made against the proposal, arguing that current services 
to implement wiretaps retroactively have a greater likelihood of creating 
security holes for hackers than the proposed CALEA software.  
Part VII will establish that in spite of relevant government interests 
advanced by the CALEA proposal, there is not enough information about 
why the government truly needs the services to justify the dangers that 
could arise. The potential costs are too great for the government to have 
free reign with expanding CALEA, and the FBI should either continue to 
use their powers under current wiretap laws to the best of their abilities, or 
give substantially more information to the American public about why such 
a change would be warranted. Even if the government presents further 
information about why such measures are needed, it is unlikely that the 
government interests will be found to outweigh the disadvantages to the 
American public. The FBI would then be recommended to proceed to the 
best of its abilities while utilizing its current capabilities.  
II. HISTORY OF WIRETAP AND SURVEILLANCE LAW 
Although the government has used wiretaps for law enforcement for 
over a century, Congress first regulated their use in the 1968 Omnibus 
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Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.6 Title III of this Act permitted and 
closely regulated use of wiretaps for investigations of criminal activity, and 
Congress regulated government wiretapping in international investigations 
through the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.7 Over time, as 
technology has advanced, the law has similarly needed to change to stay 
relevant.  
CALEA was passed in 1994 to require telephone and broadband 
companies to specifically construct their services to efficiently comply with 
wiretap orders.8 The passing of CALEA represented a departure from 
previous wiretap law due to the government’s use of its authority to 
establish the precise way that telephone networks should be designed.9 As 
discussed further in Part IV, the legislation that ruled how communications 
providers would develop their networks demonstrates a growing 
relationship between the state and the private sector with regard to the 
Internet and wiretapping. According to Sun Microsystems Laboratories 
engineer Susan Landau, before CALEA, the government had “left the 
design of wiretap technology to the people who developed and ran the 
communications technology,” rather than instructing communications 
providers on the specifics of how to configure their systems.10 
As the market for traditional telephone systems began to decline with 
the advent of VoIP communications, the FBI found that it was unable to 
wiretap significant quantities of American telephonic communications and 
petitioned the FCC to interpret CALEA in a way which would expand it to 
include the authority of the government to regulate VoIP communications 
as well.11 In 2004, the FCC complied with the FBI’s request and 
controversially extended CALEA’s power.12 Much of the debate 
surrounding the FCC’s decision to broaden CALEA had to do with the 
legitimacy of the FCC’s power to interpret CALEA beyond what many 
believed the legislative intent entailed.13 Critics had also questioned the 
FCC decision in light of the substantial threats that requiring wiretap 
capability would impose on innovation, privacy, and security.14 Many of 
the concerns aired in response to the FCC’s 2004 decision are still 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. at 409.  
 7. Id. at 409–10.  
 8. Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devices and Methods, supra note 1. 
 9. See Landau, supra note 5, at 417. 
 10. Id.; see Constance L. Martin, Exalted Technology: Should CALEA Be Expanded to 
Authorize Internet Wiretapping?, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 140, 144–45 (2005).  
 11. Landau, supra note 5, at 410. 
 12. Id. at 421–22. 
 13. See Martin, supra note 10.  
 14. Landau, supra note 5, at 410. 
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substantially relevant and apply fully to the potential expansion of CALEA 
to all Internet communications. 
The controversy surrounding the FCC’s decision led to a D.C. Circuit 
Court case, which upheld the FCC’s authority to interpret CALEA to 
include VoIP.15 When the FCC interpreted CALEA to include VoIP, the 
rest of Internet communications were intentionally excluded as beyond the 
scope of the Act.16 The contemporary expansion of CALEA that the 
Obama administration is promoting, in addition to creating new powers for 
law enforcement to wiretap communications over the Internet, would 
further endorse the FCC’s interpretive power and endorse the use of 
wiretaps for VoIP communications. 
III. PROPOSED EXPANSION OF CALEA 
The amendment of CALEA to enable wiretapping of all Internet 
communications would likely involve an expansion of existing provisions 
that include specific changes that companies would need to make in order 
for their services to be wiretap-capable. Requirements for companies would 
potentially include: 
• “Communications services that encrypt messages must have a 
way to unscramble them.”17 
• “Foreign-based providers that do business inside the United 
States must install a domestic office capable of performing 
intercepts.”18 
• “Developers of software that enables peer-to-peer 
communication must redesign their service to allow 
interception.”19 
• Provisions for a fine or penalty for failure to comply.20 
In addition, CALEA would likely be amended to be written in 
“technologically neutral” terms to prevent its requirements from becoming 
obsolete.21 These provisions would have consequences for the ability of the 
government to wiretap, the method in which Internet communications 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 16. Martin, supra note 10, at 155. 
 17. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3; see also Charlie Savage, FBI Seeks Wider Wiretap 
Law for Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 11/17/technology/ 
17wiretap.html?_r=1&ref=wiretapping_and_other_eavesdropping_ devices_and_methods 
[hereinafter Savage Nov. 16]. 
 18. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3; Savage Nov. 16, supra note 17. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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services run their organizations, and the privacy and freedom of speech of 
the American people. 
In spite of the consequences that the expansion of CALEA would 
have, there was no public response from online companies after the Obama 
administration declared its intentions.22 Companies such as Google, 
Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Research in Motion, who are “never shy 
about issuing press releases,” were all silent in response to the plan.23 The 
companies, which are normally strongly defensive of their privacy records 
and the privacy rights of their users, presented a front of silence, with the 
exception of Facebook’s comment that “‘[w]e will examine any proposal 
when and if it materializes but we can’t comment on something we haven’t 
seen. Generally, it’s our policy to only comply with valid, legal requests for 
data.”24  
It has been speculated that the online companies have not responded 
to the declaration because the Obama administration has not offered 
specifics for the companies to comment on.25 Yet the executives of a 
number of technology firms and Google and Facebook met with Robert S. 
Mueller III, the director of the FBI, on November 15, 2010, to discuss “a 
proposal to make it easier to wiretap Internet users.”26 The way the wiretap 
proposal was received was not clear as the online companies have not 
publicly discussed the matter, and it is, therefore, unknown what they 
would think about the potential expansion of CALEA.  
IV. GROWTH OF THE INTERNET AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
ONLINE COMPANIES 
As is hinted by the meeting between the online companies and the 
FBI director regarding the expansion of wiretap capabilities to the Internet, 
the relationship between the private sector and the government has 
strengthened in the recent past with regard to the Internet. Although the 
authority to wiretap the Internet already exists, CALEA does not apply to 
online companies, and many of them wait until they are served with 
wiretap orders before developing interception capabilities.27 The potential 
expansion of CALEA represents a trend of increased participation between 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Verne G. Kopytoff, Internet Wiretapping Proposal Met with Silence, N.Y. TIMES 
BITS BLOG, Sept. 28, 2010, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/internet-wiretapping-
proposal-met-with-silence/. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26. Savage Nov. 16, supra note 17. 
 27. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3. 
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the government and the private sector with regard to the Internet, which has 
potential adverse consequences.  
A.  History of the Relationship 
While many view the Internet as a “grassroots” innovation, the 
Internet was originally created by American military strategists and was 
only later privatized.28 In 1958, the United States Department of Defense 
created the Advanced Research Project Agency (“ARPA”), an agency to 
sponsor military research projects.29 ARPA funded university and 
corporate programs “concerning the creation of a computer network to 
access and share data and programs among computers located in different 
places.”30 As the development of the project began during the Cold War, its 
appeal was that during large-scale international conflicts it could guarantee 
secure control over information transfers.31 ARPANET, the precursor of 
the Internet, was designed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
researcher Lawrence G. Roberts in 1966.32 In October 1969, the first “host-
to-host message” was sent from the University of California at Los Angeles 
to the Stanford Research Institute, and, over time, nodes were added to 
expand the network.33 
ARPANET’s single network and few dozen nodes developed into the 
Internet over the course of a decade, becoming “a system of many 
interconnected networks, capable of almost indefinite expansion.”34 The 
Department of Defense initially continued to be heavily involved in the 
emergence of the Internet by “funding research and development, 
transferring technology to operational forces, using its financial resources 
to shape the commercial market for network products, and exercising 
management control over the ARPANET and its community of users.”35 
While the government never truly released all of its relationship with the 
Internet, for a time it backed off controlling and running the Internet and 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The 
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, paras. 2, 24 
(2003).  
 29. ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS & ALESSANDRO VESPIGNANI, EVOLUTION AND 
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNET: A STATISTICAL PHYSICS APPROACH xiii, 2 (2004). 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 113 (1999). 
 35. Id. at 114. 
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instead “focused on its regulatory role of shaping the rules that govern 
Internet-related activities.”36  
Not long after its government origins, the Internet was broadly viewed 
in the 1980s and 1990s as representing the decline of the State.37 The 
Internet is a “decentralized network that derived its resilience from the 
absence of a central command,” and many believed that control of it by a 
particular government would be unmanageable.38 While the Internet was 
originally understood by some to be a “post-national situation” whose 
advent was confronted with “mourning or celebrating” the “inevitable 
sidelining of the State,” the growing relationship between the government 
and online corporations suggests that this view is mistaken.39 
In recent years, since the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
government has started to reclaim some control over Internet operations 
through growing collaboration with private online companies.40 Legislation 
was passed following the September 11th tragedy that increased the 
authority of the federal government to participate in the realm of the 
Internet, and the government has principally increased its power of 
electronic communication interception and collection.41 Some argue that 
the government is regaining control by taking over “ready-made, often 
quite-centralized, private nodes of power” through both recruitment and, in 
many cases, voluntary action by the private companies.42  
B.  Cooperation of the FBI and Online Companies 
The FBI has recently developed a “Going Dark Program” to improve 
its ability to perform electronic surveillance, particularly in light of what it 
says are difficulties in obtaining wiretap capabilities efficiently from some 
companies.43 Under current systems, some communications carriers have 
been unable to carry out wiretap orders. One of the difficulties law 
enforcement has faced with Internet wiretapping is that one of the major 
American communications carriers failed to carry out over one hundred 
wiretap orders from 2008 to 2009 due to an eight-month lapse.44 After the 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at para. 2. 
 37. Id. at para. 1. 
 38. Id. at paras. 1, 45.  
 39. Id. at para. 1. 
 40. Id. at para. 83. 
 41. Id. at paras. 83–84. 
 42. Id. at para. 2. 
 43. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3; Charlie Savage, Officials to Push to Bolster Law on 
Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/ 
us/19wiretap.html [hereinafter Savage Oct. 19]. 
 44. Savage Oct. 19, supra note 43. 
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first lapse was fixed, the carrier again experienced difficulties, which 
prevented electronic surveillance interception for another nine days.45 In 
2009, another major carrier dealt with similar interruptions “ranging from 
nine days to six weeks and was unable to comply with 14 wiretap 
orders.”46 Many of the interruptions were seen to be caused by upgrades 
made to networks, and the FBI sent engineers to help the companies 
address the problems.47 Along with sending engineers to assist companies, 
every year the FBI spends around $20 million to assist private companies 
with fixing network problems that interfere with the FBI’s electronic 
surveillance capabilities.48 
In addition to FBI participation in network problems, further 
cooperation between the government and the private online companies has 
occurred through direct voluntary participation of companies with the 
government. Joseph E. Sullivan, Director of Compliance and Law 
Enforcement Relations at eBay, has “offered to hand over information, 
when requested, without a subpoena.”49 This is significant as the eBay 
corporation controls a colossal amount of information, including “financial 
records, names, user IDs and passwords, affiliations, e-mail addresses, 
physical addresses, shipping information, contact information, and 
transaction information” for eBay and PayPal.50 Many other companies 
have adopted similar law enforcement-friendly policies, and have been met 
with similar responses: “[w]hether the Big Brother we distrust is 
government and its agencies, or multinational corporations, the emerging 
collaboration between the two in the online environment produces the 
ultimate threat.”51  
This sentiment has been echoed in testimony from the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) submitted to the House Judiciary Subcommittee 
on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security on February 17, 2011, in an 
examination of the proposal of the CALEA expansion. The ACLU argued 
that the proposal would mean “a dramatic expansion of a dangerous idea” 
that the private sector and online companies would have the power to build 
the government’s surveillance structure.52 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at para. 3. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Murphy & Calabrese, supra note 4, at 3. 
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C.  Compliance with CALEA 
Further development of the relationship between the government and 
the private sector online companies can be shown through the enactment of 
the “safe harbor” provision under CALEA. The current provision states that 
if a particular communications carrier meets industry standards, it will be 
considered in compliance.53 The standard required includes “providing the 
content of a call or e-mail, along with identifying information like its 
recipient, time and location,” and failure to meet this standard could lead to 
fines imposed by a judge or the FCC.54 In spite of these strict standards, 
many law enforcement officials admit that “neither option is ever invoked” 
because the government prefers to foster the government relationship with 
industry rather than file complaints against companies.55 The emphasis of 
the government on the industry relationship—rather than improving 
capabilities—can be argued to “create an incentive to let problems linger: 
Once a carrier’s interception capability is restored -- even if it was fixed at 
taxpayer expense -- its service is compliant again with the 1994 law, so the 
issue is moot.”56  
 Company compliance with the law has been rather difficult to 
establish in the first place, demonstrating the potential failures of CALEA 
to have beneficial results for law enforcement. When CALEA was 
originally enacted in 1994, compliance by telephone and communications 
carriers was so difficult that the FCC extended the original date for 
compliance by two years.57 In spite of the extension, four years after the 
date set for compliance, there continued to be “frequent allegations of 
noncompliance.”58 There was a hearing House Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and the Internet hearing in 2004 to discuss the lack of 
full CALEA implementation, during which “spokespersons for the FBI and 
DOJ stated that many companies still do not comply with CALEA, 
primarily because of inadequate technology.”59  
In a Department of Justice audit report, it has also been noted that the 
costs of implementation had been much higher than estimated, and it was 
significant that “the FBI could not show the extent to which inability to 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006); see 
Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devices and Methods, supra note 1. 
 54. Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devises and Methods, supra note 1. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Savage Oct. 19, supra note 43. 
 57. Martin, supra note 10, at 145–46.  
 58. Id. at 146. 
 59. Id. at 146 n.35.  
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implement CALEA had negatively affected FBI surveillance.”60 The goal 
of compliance was unsuccessful in spite of the $500 million authorized by 
CALEA for reasonable cost reimbursement for carriers and the threat of a 
fine for each noncomplying carrier of up to $10,000 each.61 The difficulties 
faced by companies attempting to achieve compliance raises questions as to 
whether government-required system changes are the most effective 
method for law enforcement to increase their ability to wiretap suspects 
that are Internet users. 
D.  Implications of a Strong Relationship Between the Government 
and the Private Sector 
While a strengthened relationship between the government and 
private industry with regard to the Internet could potentially be the answer 
to solving compliance problems with wiretap orders, this relationship also 
poses a threat to American industry. The development of CALEA was a 
departure from previous law due to its requirement that companies follow 
government-directed approaches to configure their networks to comply 
with wiretap orders. The growth of the government-industry collaboration, 
signified by this change, could pose a danger to the online environment,62 
both as a threat to individual freedom and as an unwelcome influence on 
the development of technology and code.63  
Landau argues that the deviation from previous law that CALEA 
represents is problematic due to the imposition on providers of a plan for 
how technical networks should work. Landau points out that “[i]n no 
instance prior to CALEA did Congress legislate how the communications 
providers should configure their networks; instead, Congress left the design 
of wiretap technology to the people who developed and ran the 
communications technology.”64 Landau also argues that it would make 
more sense to leave the discretion about network configuration to the 
providers themselves in order to best balance the needs of law enforcement 
and the privacy needs of customers through use of market forces.65 The 
existence of market forces put communications carriers “in a natural 
position to balance the opposing needs of law enforcement and customer 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Martin, supra note 10, at 146 n.34 (citation omitted). 
 61. Id. at 145–46. 
 62. Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at para. 3. 
 63. Id. at paras. 20–21.  
 64. Landau, supra note 5, at 417. 
 65. See id. 
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privacy,” and the industry itself should therefore be in charge of how 
networks are configured to comply with CALEA.66 
V. CONCERNS OF INTERNET WIRETAPS IN THE FACE OF AN 
EXPANDING CALEA  
In addition to reservations about the application of current CALEA 
law and the consequences of the relationship between the government and 
the private sector, there are similar concerns about the expansion of 
CALEA and the ramifications it would have for American citizens, online 
communications providers, and the Internet. Such fears have to do with 
concerns about CALEA’s impact on the First Amendment right to freedom 
of speech and the Fourth Amendment right to privacy, as well as whether 
CALEA’s implementation would affect national security. There are also 
potential issues regarding the Internet’s economic impact and whether its 
innovative powers would be adversely altered by CALEA software. The 
final concern in the face of CALEA is the impact it would have 
internationally, both on citizens of other countries and on foreign 
corporations. Due to the nature of these concerns, the government should 
provide more information and evaluate the competing interests at hand in 
order to best serve the American public.   
A.  Design of the Internet 
The structure of the Internet raises relevant concerns due to the impact 
that allowing the installation of access points would have on the Internet 
itself. James X. Dempsey, Vice President of the Center for Democracy and 
Technology, argues that the CALEA proposal would have “‘huge 
implications’ and challenge[] ‘fundamental elements of the Internet 
revolution’ – including its decentralized design.”67 The “hub-and-spoke” 
design of phone and broadband communication contrasts strongly with the 
decentralized design of the Internet, meaning that there could be serious 
consequences in attempts to require wiretap technology for the Internet.68 If 
“requiring Internet providers to be able to unscramble encrypted messages 
or intercept any transmitted communication also calls for them to function 
like centralized carriers, the shift will reverse what made the Internet – and 
made it a fount of economic growth.”69 The expansion of CALEA could, 
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therefore, have significant ramifications for the structure of the Internet in 
general. 
Substantially different than the hub-and-spoke design of phone and 
broadband, the Internet is a “packet-switched” network.70 This means that 
there are no fixed circuits created as pathways for a particular 
communication and the data is instead divided into packets to be 
communicated.71 Each individual packet then travels via the least-
congested route to later be reassembled at the other end.72 This frequently 
means that the packets travel together, but sometimes the packets are 
separated during transit.73 As the system is created to allow packets to 
travel separately, it would be increasingly difficult for a wiretap system to 
intercept the information anywhere other than at the endpoints.74 
According to Landau, the design of the Internet means that “‘unless the 
communication is tapped at the endpoints . . . it’s impossible to guarantee 
100 percent access to all communication packets.”75 Wiretaps on a 
traditional Public Switch Telephone Network create switches somewhere 
between each end, but the structure of the Internet therefore requires a 
different approach for an effective wiretap.76 An additional problem is that 
“[a]s the choke point for communications comes closer to the source of the 
communications, the risk of detection becomes greater.”77 CALEA 
wiretaps thus far have required that their providers ensure that their 
information be sent over a specific switch somewhere in the middle for 
government access.78 As it is difficult to guarantee access to all information 
unless the wiretap is at the endpoint of a communication, traditional 
wiretaps may be unable to obtain sought-after information. 
The architecture of the Internet also lends itself to vulnerabilities and 
makes it more difficult to wiretap. Professor Steven Bellovin of Columbia 
University argues that the proposed expansion would require a different 
and more complicated protocol, which would create serious security 
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problems.79 The Internet is easier to undermine than a telephone network 
due to its “flexibility and dynamism,” and creating access points within the 
Internet would “build security vulnerabilities into the communication 
protocols.”80 Professor Bellovin stated that “many previous attempts to add 
such features have resulted in new, easily exploited security flaws rather 
than better law enforcement access.”81  
There is also little proof that software creating access points would be 
safeguarded against abuse.82 As a Greek form of wiretapping that similarly 
created online access points was previously exploited, creating a significant 
threat to national security, it appears that the fears of those opposing 
CALEA may have valid foundations. In 2005, hackers broke through a 
Greek legally-mandated wiretap function to gain access to communications 
of government officials.83 It was eventually discovered that over “100 high-
ranking government officials and dignitaries including the prime minister 
of Greece, his wife, and the Mayor of Athens” had their phones 
compromised and conversations overheard through manipulation of the 
Vodafone Greece network.84 The bugging began sometime before the 2004 
Olympic Games in Athens and remained undiscovered until January 24, 
2005.85 Not only is it worrisome that the hackers remained undiscovered 
for so long, but even more concerning is that the only reason they were 
ever discovered at all was that the hackers added something to the software 
that blocked delivery of text messages, leading technicians to check if 
anyone was listening in the “electronic back door.”86 The scope of the 
information obtained by the hackers and what it was used for was never 
discovered, but “no other computer crime on record has had the same 
potential for capturing information about affairs of state.”87 
The American system would have similar vulnerabilities if wiretap 
capabilities were inserted into the networks of communications carriers, 
and it has been specifically alleged that retrofitted “CALEA installations 
are poorly maintained, lacking adequate security measures such as a 
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firewall, and are open to hacking.”88 There are also potential security risks 
with Internet wiretapping because the packets of information obtained 
through Internet wiretapping are then shipped via the Internet to a third 
party.89 This system would allow an insider the access and capability to 
retrieve unauthorized information without being discovered.90  
The possibility that building an access point for the FBI to wiretap 
communications might also be a weakness for hackers to exploit is a 
potential national security problem.91 Landau argues that this technology 
“presents a fat target for foreign intelligence agencies,” giving them the 
capability of broad access to American Internet communications without 
needing to build any access points of their own.92 She says that “[w]ere 
Internet wiretapping technology to be penetrated and exploited by foreign 
intelligence services, massive surveillance of U.S. ‘persons’ (citizens and 
corporations) might follow.”93 This level of potential breach could be 
devastating for the well-being of American corporations as well as the 
safety of American citizens. 
B.  Fourth Amendment Privacy Concerns 
Beyond traditional concerns with law enforcement wiretapping, the 
implementation of Internet wiretaps poses additional privacy 
considerations. The expansion of CALEA would not change the 
government’s capabilities of obtaining warrants under existing wiretap law, 
but privacy interests would still be threatened through the creation of 
“access points” by law enforcement.94 Much of the additional concern for 
application of wiretaps to the Internet has to do with the particularities of 
the Internet that would make it possible for a third party to find access to 
private information through the access points.95 The Internet’s 
decentralized and open features combined with the fact that it involves 
distribution of data packets over networks “presents difficulties in isolating 
specific communications directed for extraction under a court order.”96 
Access points created to enable law enforcement to wiretap the Internet 
could very possibly “also allow unauthorized access into private 
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communications.”97 This privacy concern was also an issue with the 
expansion of CALEA by the FCC to apply to VoIP communications, but it 
is even more relevant to a potential decision to expand easy access for 
wiretap capabilities to all Internet communications.  
The concerns of allowing easy access points over the Internet for all 
online communications companies instills further concern due to the fact 
that people reveal more of themselves online than over telephone 
conversations.98 Privacy advocates argue that the Internet should be subject 
to different treatment than phone networks due to the fact that the Internet 
provides an entirely different medium of communication.99 Susan 
Freiwald, Professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law, 
argues: 
[W]e reveal more of ourselves online than on the telephone, because 
we are more clearly identified with our Internet activities via our 
password-protected accounts. We transmit much richer information 
online than offline; in addition to conversations, we send pictures, 
videos, songs, and long documents. We also create records of our 
activities when we shop, read, play, organize, and date online.100 
As Freiwald’s argument demonstrates, average Americans reveal 
more of themselves online because the medium allows for a variety of 
different types of communication. The risk is, therefore, that the 
government will have access to substantially more information than it 
would with a telephone wiretap. As pointed out by Democratic Senator 
Ron Wyden of Oregon in response to the FCC’s expansive interpretation of 
CALEA, “[i]t’s possible to fight terrorism ferociously without gutting civil 
liberties. The challenge in striking that balance is to have ground rules.”101  
Fears surrounding Americans’ privacy concerns regarding 
unauthorized wiretaps have been validated by previous government action. 
The Bush administration amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (“FISA”) in 2008, which “sanctioned spying without a warrant, 
without suspicion, and without court approval.”102 The law was amended in 
order to retroactively give legal cover to over five years of spying through 
illegal wiretaps by the government.103 While the expansion of CALEA is 
not for a similar retroactive protection, “the risks of executive overreach 
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are still there.”104 The argument has been made that Congress should be 
especially careful in drafting any new provisions for CALEA in order to 
delineate what powers are given to the executive branch, such that the 
scope of the law will not “spread far beyond what’s said to be 
contemplated.”105 
Additional privacy concerns exist due to the Supreme Court decision 
in Bartnicki v. Vopper, which indicates that newspapers and publishers can, 
in some situations, escape criminal liability that would otherwise arise from 
publishing illegally intercepted conversations.106 The Supreme Court held 
that “privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in 
publishing matters of public importance.”107 As Internet wiretaps provide 
vulnerabilities, which could be taken advantage of by third parties, the 
ability of the media to potentially publish material obtained illegally 
without facing government sanctions further heightens this threat to 
American privacy.  
A privacy advocacy group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is 
concerned that there are “obvious civil liberty and privacy issues” with the 
Obama administration plan to expand CALEA.108 It argues that the existing 
statutes for wiretap orders give law enforcement agencies sufficient reign 
to have access to Internet communication information.109 It also argues that 
the reason for the expansion of the law is that the government does not get 
the information as quickly as it would wish, and that the government 
should have to “bear the burden of proof for why [the government] need[s] 
this,” although in most circumstances it tends not to be required.110 The 
Obama administration should therefore provide more information to justify 
such threats to Americans’ rights. 
C.  Threat to the First Amendment Freedom of Speech 
Among the extensive concerns regarding application of CALEA to all 
Internet companies is the potential threat to speech it would impose. 
Privacy advocates argue that the plan would be a threat to First 
Amendment freedom of speech protections and that the installation of 
wiretap capabilities within Internet communications provider networks 
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would be readily open to abuse.111 Due to the potential for abuse of the 
proposed wiretap capabilities, there is an inherent fear that chilling of 
speech could occur.  
There are two types of chilling effects: one that chills illegal conduct 
when a government policy or statute prohibits it, and one “when 
individuals seeking to engage in lawful activity are deterred from doing so 
by a government regulation not specifically directed at that activity.”112 
This second form of chilling effect is extremely harmful to both the 
individual deterred from exercising his or her rights and to society in 
general.113 The First Amendment has been considered to be “based on the 
assumption, perhaps unprovable, that the uninhibited exchange of 
information, the active search for truth, and the open criticism of 
government are positive virtues.”114 Some argue that the level of impact of 
the chilling effect depends on the fear associated with the potential 
chilling.115 In the case of Internet wiretaps, the fear that private information 
communicated to other parties could be intercepted by the government or 
hackers could cause pervasive anxiety.  
The interference with online speech is alarming due to the immense 
benefits provided by anonymity in particular. The Supreme Court has said 
that protections for anonymous speech epitomize the purpose behind the 
First Amendment: “to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and 
their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.”116 In 
some cases, anonymity on the Internet is critical due to the sensitive nature 
of material being shared by online speakers such as whistleblowers and 
human rights workers struggling against repressive regimes.117 The Internet 
is touted for its propensity to allow people to interact online anonymously 
and to encourage people to be able to say anything they wish without fear 
of repercussion.118 It has also been described as “one of the greatest tools 
for exercising an individual’s constitutional rights.”119 If CALEA is 
amended, people will feel less secure in the anonymity of online forums 
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and online communication, and the abundant flow of speech on the Internet 
could be chilled. 
Those who argue against an anonymous Internet point out that online 
anonymity creates opportunities for crime and harassment to go 
unpunished.120 Anonymity is sometimes said to allow people to avoid 
taking responsibility for their communications and to encourage things like 
“offensive or defamatory newsgroup postings, or sexually harassing e-
mail.”121 Although anonymity has been blamed for allowing anonymous 
speakers to be “hit-and-run drivers on the infobahn,”122 the disadvantages 
caused by its abuse do not outweigh its significant benefits. 
D.  Economic and Innovation Concerns 
There are concerns with regard to the well-being of industry and the 
innovation of online companies related to the CALEA proposal. One of the 
first issues is that much of the cost would be covered by the online 
companies themselves. According to former Justice Department lawyer 
Michael A. Sussmann, the CALEA expansion proposal would lead to a 
“technology and security headache” because of the hassles of 
implementation, and “the investigative burden and costs will shift to 
providers.”123 
There is also evidence that the consequential implementation of the 
proposal would discourage innovation and impede production. Landau 
argued that the proposal would be particularly detrimental to small startups, 
as “[e]very engineer who is developing the wiretap system is an engineer 
who is not building in greater security, more features, or getting the product 
out faster.”124 The fear that the proposal will interfere with innovation of 
online companies is similarly shared by a number of other critics, as well as 
the Departments of Commerce and State.125 When the FCC initially 
interpreted CALEA to expand its scope beyond how it had been used to 
apply to VoIP, there was speculation that the FCC would institute a pre-
approval system for technology, “requiring submission to and approval by 
the FCC.”126 Although the request was not granted for the system at the 
time, the implementation of Internet wiretaps would impose a hindrance on 
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innovation of telecommunications technologies.127 Landau points out that 
innovators would no longer “be able to have an idea, develop it, and go to 
the market; instead, early on, they would need to consult with the FBI. 
They would need lawyers and lobbyists—and time.”128 Such a requirement 
would definitely interfere with innovative processes, which in turn could 
threaten national security due to the importance of maintaining the United 
States’ scientific and industrial strength.129 
The threat to innovation could also cripple the position of American 
products within the global market. This was a fear of encryption makers in 
the late 1990s, which is renewed today in light of the CALEA proposal, as 
many believe that forcing regulations on U.S.-developed technology would 
drive the market for innovation overseas.130  
E.  International Impact 
The expansion of CALEA would also have a significant international 
impact, both through software implementation by foreign governments and 
the impact on international communication and international commerce. 
The technologies developed to carry out the CALEA orders could be 
utilized by other governments in ways that remove or diminish the privacy 
of their citizens on the Internet. Even the Departments of Commerce and 
State have expressed fear131 that such technologies would be “used by 
repressive regimes to hunt for political dissidents.”132  
Foreign corporations would also be impacted by the CALEA 
expansion as the government would require them to comply with the law 
through the services they provide to American consumers. Affected 
companies might include Research in Motion (the Canadian maker of 
BlackBerry devices) and others that have services based overseas.133 
Overseas-based services would have to change the design of their systems 
so that messages could be intercepted and unscrambled and would 
therefore “have to route communications through a server on United States 
soil where they could be wiretapped.”134 
The expansion of CALEA would therefore have significant 
international impact, which would not only encourage repressive actions by 
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foreign regimes but would also unfavorably constrain international 
companies and service providers to the requirements of the law.  
VI. REASONS GIVEN FOR EXPANDING CALEA 
Those opposed to CALEA have presented extensive arguments 
detailing the dangers of the proposal, to which the FBI and the Obama 
administration have, to some extent, countered to defend their position. The 
government argues that as the expansion of CALEA is within the scope of 
its current authority under wiretap law and that it does not create danger to 
the magnitude that its opponents allege; the CALEA expansion is, 
therefore, needed to serve the government interest in preventing and 
investigating crime. 
A.  Within Scope of Government Authority 
In response to the arguments that the proposal of the Obama 
administration to expand CALEA is unwise and likely to cause an 
abundance of problems, the FBI argues that the proposal would not have 
detrimental consequences because it is not an expansion of law 
enforcement authority to wiretap. The CALEA provisions do not affect the 
legality of wiretaps nor the requirements imposed on law enforcement 
officials for obtaining wiretap orders. Valerie E. Caproni, General Counsel 
to the FBI, stated that the expansion would address lawfully authorized 
intercepts and that the FBI is promoting the expanded CALEA provisions 
to preserve the “ability to execute our existing authority in order to protect 
the public safety and national security.”135 The government argues these 
provisions are merely an attempt to keep up with criminal and terrorist 
activity in a world in which communication increasingly occurs online.136 
B.  Government Interest in Preventing and Investigating Crime 
An important part of law enforcement is undeniably the ability to 
investigate and prevent crime through lawful use of wiretap and 
surveillance capabilities. As the world has transitioned to a significant 
portion of all communications occurring on the Internet, federal law 
enforcement and national security officials argue that their ability to 
wiretap is “‘going dark’ as people increasingly communicate online instead 
of by telephone.”137 The Internet has been increasingly used by criminals 
and terrorists for the very purpose of avoiding surveillance by law 
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enforcement, and the inability of the FBI to wiretap adequately has led to 
some situations in which potentially preventable crimes occurred.   
One example that has been widely reported in the media is that some 
of the September 11th hijackers may have used public computers in Florida 
and New Jersey to access the Internet and communicate with each other.138 
Two of the hijackers used a state college library in New Jersey to review 
and order airline tickets on the flight that crashed into the Pentagon.139 
Wisconsin Representative James Sensenbrenner, Jr., saying that it puts 
Americans’ lives at risk, argued that such places should not be permitted to 
be sanctuaries for terrorists to operate.140 
In 2010, an investigation into a drug cartel failed because the 
smugglers used peer-to-peer software that was tough to intercept, and, 
instead, the investigators had to install equipment in a suspect’s office.141 
The delay “prevented the interception of pertinent communications.”142 In 
her statement to the House Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism 
and Homeland Security on February 17, 2011, Valerie E. Caproni 
discussed two other situations that occurred recently, where the 
government was unable to gain more information on suspects because of 
the inability of the FBI to wiretap their communications.143 One example 
was that the Drug Enforcement Agency, in an investigation of the leader of 
a criminal organization involved in cocaine smuggling, realized that the 
suspect was a former law enforcement officer who “went to great lengths to 
utilize communications services that lacked intercept solutions,” and the 
government was unable to obtain enough information through other 
techniques.144 Caproni’s other example was a child prostitution case, in 
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which a social networking site used by the suspect did not have wiretap 
capabilities, and the FBI argued that although it was able to prosecute, the 
case was weaker and the resulting sentence was lighter than it may have 
been otherwise.145 Due to the increasing communication over the Internet 
by criminals and terrorists, the government argues that the expansion of 
CALEA is necessary to maintain public safety and national security. 
Although the government argues its surveillance capabilities are 
disappearing, in 2009, law enforcement agencies utilized a record 2,376 
wiretaps, each yielding an average of 3,763 intercepted communications.146 
Privacy advocates argue that these numbers suggest that the FBI is 
“experiencing a boon in electronic surveillance” rather than being thwarted 
by technological barriers.147  
C.  Current Retrofit Services Delay Ability to Wiretap 
The FBI and federal officials argue that the CALEA proposal should 
also move forward due to the problems that the government faces using old 
methods of wiretapping over the Internet. In many cases, if the FBI wants 
to wiretap a suspect who is using the Internet, it must retrofit a 
communications network, which can delay the process for months.148 
When a service is encrypted, sometimes even the provider cannot 
unscramble it, which prevents federal agents from obtaining 
communications at all.149 Officials disagree with the allegation that 
installing access points will create weaknesses that would then be used by 
hackers to view the same information that the government is gathering. 
Instead, the government argues that building interception capability into 
service providers is less likely to “inadvertently create security holes than 
retrofitting it after receiving a wiretap order.”150  
In response to the accusation that the expansion of CALEA would be 
a serious threat to innovation, government officials point out that the same 
fear was prevalent when CALEA was first enacted in 1994 and that critics 
argued that the law would “impede cellphone innovation, but that 
technology continued to improve.”151 Government officials, therefore, 
argue that the CALEA expansion is necessary to maintain their ability to 
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conduct law enforcement and maintain national security in the best 
interests of the American people. 
VII. MORE INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BALANCE COMPETING 
INTERESTS ADEQUATELY 
The Obama administration’s proposal to expand CALEA to enable 
the FBI to require all communications services to be wiretap-capable has 
created debate over whether government interests would truly be met, and 
whether government interests outweigh the opposing concerns. As there are 
a number of competing interests on both sides of the debate, and significant 
factors indicate that the detrimental nature of a CALEA expansion would 
outweigh the government’s interests, more information should be provided 
before any further steps are taken. 
A.  Competing Interests 
The proposed legislation is representative of the strengthening 
relationship between the government and the private sector with regard to 
the Internet. The FBI cooperates extensively with networks as it is, and the 
proposals would advance this relationship further. This has created fear 
among some that the relationship will become a threat to the online 
environment.152 
Other concerns regarding the expansion of CALEA include the fear 
that it will chill online speech that has a positive impact on society and that 
it will threaten valued American privacy.153 Further reservations have been 
voiced regarding the negative impact CALEA would have on the aspects of 
Internet structure which contribute to its economic fruitfulness.154 The 
design of the Internet would also be a problem for national security reasons 
as the software, which would be introduced for networks to comply with 
CALEA, could introduce vulnerabilities into the system that could be 
abused by hackers to access critical data. There are also misgivings about 
the software that would be created to wiretap the Internet because of the 
potential consequences it could have in the hands of repressive regimes and 
the harm it could cause to foreign corporations.155 
The government argues that CALEA should be expanded because it is 
not an extension of current government authority to wiretap under the law 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at para. 3.  
 153. Horn, supra note 112, at 750 (quoting Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First 
Amendment: Unraveling the ‘Chilling Effect,’ 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693–700 (1978)). 
 154. Editorial, supra note 68. 
 155. Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devices and Methods, supra note 1; Savage 
Nov. 16, supra note 17. 
396 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64 
and it would advance significant state interests.156 Emphasizing the 
importance of being able to wiretap in order to prevent and investigate 
crime, the FBI argues that there have been times that crimes have occurred 
when it could have been prevented had the capabilities to intercept Internet 
communications been available.157 The FBI also argues that the potential 
for vulnerabilities to be exposed to hackers are even greater if the services 
have to be retrofitted rather than introduced through CALEA software.158 
B.  Lack of Information 
In spite of these relevant government interests, the disparity between 
the arguments remains too large to justify the current expansion of 
CALEA. Along with the numerous critiques of the Obama administration’s 
proposal to expand CALEA is the point that there is little public data about 
the frequency with which “court-approved surveillance is frustrated 
because of a service’s technical design.”159 The ACLU argued in front of 
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland 
Security on February 17, 2011 that the expansion of the government’s 
ability to wiretap the Internet is unnecessary because “[t]he number of 
wiretap orders the government seeks every year is a matter of public record 
and that record does not support this level of privacy invasion.”160 In the 
2009 Wiretap Report, there were only thirty-two computer wiretap orders 
and only one encrypted communication order.161 For the one encrypted 
communication order, law enforcement eventually gained access to the 
clear text of the communication.162 
At the same hearing in front of the House Judiciary Subcommittee, 
the General Counsel of the FBI, Valerie E. Caproni, made updated 
statements about the intentions of the government with regard to the 
proposed expansion in the law.163 Caproni announced that in the 2012 
fiscal year, the government intends to establish a Domestic 
Communications Assistance Center (“DCAC”) which would “leverage the 
research and development efforts of Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement with respect to electronic surveillance capabilities, facilitate 
the sharing of technology between law enforcement agencies, advance 
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initiatives to implement solutions complying with CALEA, and seek to 
build more effective relations with the communications industry.”164 
Caproni also stated that the government “does not have a formal 
position . . . on whether any legislative changes are necessary,” appearing 
to be possibly retreating from previous statements made by the 
administration.165 Whether there is a formal position or not, the 
government has been moving toward a legislative change, and Caproni 
herself said that the Obama administration is looking forward to working 
with Congress to find a solution.166 Documents obtained through a 
Freedom of Information Act request by the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
also demonstrate that “the FBI and Justice Department have been working 
on amendments to CALEA since 2006 and have been lobbying Congress 
and the White House to support it.”167 
The potential consequences of what could occur in the wake of a 
CALEA expansion, therefore, seem unjustified. Before enacting any new 
CALEA provisions into law, Congress should strongly consider whether 
the changes are truly necessary or whether the current capabilities of the 
FBI to wiretap Internet users are sufficient.168 As discussed, there are 
competing interests that need to be taken into account, but since the FBI 
has not given substantial information about the reasons that these broad 
changes are needed, significantly more data should be gathered in order to 
best address these interests before CALEA is expanded.  
C.  Moving Forward 
In order to balance the interests at hand more effectively, the creation 
of the DCAC, as discussed by Valerie Caproni, could gather further 
information about why exactly the change of CALEA is required for 
government interests to be met. This information should then be given to 
Congress and the American public, before further legislative action occurs, 
to ensure that additional Internet wiretapping capabilities for the 
government are truly necessary. The information gathered by the DCAC 
could be delivered in a method similar to the yearly Wiretap Report, 
providing transparency for the American public to track the extent to which 
their communications are being monitored. All that would be required on 
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such a report is the raw data, as it would be unwise to include specific 
examples that could lead suspects to realize that they are under government 
surveillance. The DCAC should work with the FBI to create such a report 
to demonstrate the extent to which government efforts to prevent and 
investigate crime have been foiled by the failure to wiretap Internet 
communications. Whether the government would have had the ability to 
get the information through other legitimate means when compiling the 
report should also be taken into account.   
As the proposed DCAC is also suggested to “leverage existing 
research and development efforts of federal law enforcement,”169 the 
DCAC could conceivably work to develop advanced technology that would 
avoid the current dangers from inserting access points into the existing 
Internet structure. If these proposed objectives are satisfied, the DCAC 
itself might assist in confronting some of the current dangers surrounding 
an expansion of CALEA. Landau and the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(“IETF”), an “international community of researchers who seek to provide 
standards to the evolution of the Internet’s architecture,” agree that the 
design of a “more secure Internet amenable to law enforcement purposes” 
could be plausible.170 Their present concerns are focused on inserting 
access points in the Internet as it is presently structured and the “inherent 
security problems it would create.”171  
With systems as they currently exist and the information currently 
provided, it does not appear that the government could provide a strong 
enough argument for Internet wiretapping capabilities to outweigh the 
prevailing interests of the American public. The expansion of CALEA 
would partially infringe on the constitutionally provided First and Fourth 
Amendment freedoms and would create problems for industry development 
and national security. The government has a high burden of proof to 
demonstrate that such risks would be worth extending CALEA wiretapping 
to all Internet communications. The handful of examples provided by the 
government thus far should not be found by Congress to be worth 
justifying the expansion. The FBI and the Obama administration should, 
therefore, reconsider their proposal in light of the potential threats their 
actions could have on the security and well-being of the American public.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although a formal proposal has yet to be introduced, the American 
public should be wary of the steps that the government is taking to extend 
wiretapping capabilities to all Internet communications. While the 
government argues that it has been losing the opportunity to obtain 
valuable information about suspects who violate the law due to their 
communication through the use of Facebook, Skype, and BlackBerry, there 
are noteworthy hazards which could arise through an expansion of 
CALEA. Threats to constitutional rights and national security are 
ultimately what our country faces if the Obama administration and the FBI 
are successful in their attempts to create Internet access points that could be 
manipulated by our enemies.  
The looming fears surrounding the potential amendment of CALEA 
are substantively justified and demonstrate that there is much that needs to 
be addressed before Congress takes steps that potentially put our country in 
danger. The FBI should, therefore, utilize the soon-to-be created DCAC to 
gather more data to support the government’s allegations that it is missing 
out on collecting critical information due to its inability to wiretap some 
Internet communications. Once this information is gathered, it is still likely 
that a realistic evaluation of competing interests will show that there is 
entirely too much at stake to allow the government to wiretap the Internet. 
  

